The California ISO Department of Market Monitoring notes in its comments to the CPUC on proposals to address resource adequacy shortages during last August’s rolling blackouts that the number of fixed price contracts are decreasing. In DMM’s opinion, this leaves California’s market exposed to the potential for greater market manipulation. The diminishing tolling agreements and longer term contracts DMM observes is the result of the structure of the power cost indifference adjustment (PCIA) or “exit fee” for departed community choice aggregation (CCA) and direct access (DA) customers. The IOUs are left shedding contracts as their loads fall.
The PCIA is pegged to short run market prices (even more so with the true up feature added in 2019.) The PCIA mechanism works as a price hedge against the short term market values for assets for CCAs and suppresses the incentives for long-term contracts. This discourages CCAs from signing long-term agreements with renewables.
The PCIA acts as an almost perfect hedge on the retail price for departed load customers because an increase in the CAISO and capacity market prices lead to a commensurate decrease in the PCIA, so the overall retail rate remains the same regardless of where the market moves. The IOUs are all so long on their resources, that market price variation has a relatively small impact on their overall rates.
This situation is almost identical to the relationship of the competition transition charge (CTC) implemented during restructuring starting in 1998. Again, energy service providers (ESPs) have little incentive to hedge their portfolios because the CTC was tied directly to the CAISO/PX prices, so the CTC moved inversely with market prices. Only when the CAISO prices exceeded the average cost of the IOUs’ portfolios did the high prices become a problem for ESPs and their customers.
As in 1998, the solution is to have a fixed, upfront exit fee paid by departing customers that is not tied to variations in future market prices. (Commissioner Jesse Knight’s proposal along this line was rejected by the other commissioners.) By doing so, load serving entities (LSEs) will be left to hedging their own portfolios on their own basis. That will lead to LSEs signing more long term agreements of various kinds.
The alternative of forcing CCAs and ESP to sign fixed price contracts under the current PCIA structure forces them to bear the risk burden of both departed and bundled customers, and the IOUs are able to pass through the risks of their long term agreements through the PCIA.
California would be well service by the DMM to point out this inherent structural problem. We should learn from our previous errors.
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