Tag Archives: electricity markets

ERCOT has the peak period scarcity price too high

The freeze and resulting rolling outages in Texas in February highlighted the unique structure of the power market there. Customers and businesses were left with huge bills that have little to do with actual generation expenses. This is a consequence of the attempt by Texas to fit into an arcane interpretation of an economic principle where generators should be able to recover their investments from sales in just a few hours of the year. Problem is that basic of accounting for those cashflows does not match the true value of the power in those hours.

The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) runs an unusual wholesale electricity market that supposedly relies solely on hourly energy prices to provide the incentives for incenting new generation investment. However, ERCOT is using the same type of administratively-set subsidies to create enough potential revenue to cover investment costs. Further, a closer examination reveals that this price adder is set too high relative to actual consumer value for peak load power. All of this leads to a conclusion relying solely on short-run hourly prices as a proxy for the market value that accrues to new entrants is a misplaced metric.

The total ERCOT market first relies on side payments to cover commitment costs (which creates barriers to entry but that’s a separate issue) and second, it transfers consumer value through to the Operating Reserve Demand Curve (ORDC) that uses a fixed value of lost load (VOLL) in an arbitrary manner to create “opportunity costs” (more on that definition at a later time) so the market can have sufficient scarcity rents. This second price adder is at the core of ERCOT’s incentive system–energy prices alone are insufficient to support new generation investment. Yet ERCOT has ignored basic economics and set this value too high based on both available alternatives to consumers and basic regional budget constraints.

I started with an estimate of the number of hours where prices need the ORDC to be at full VOLL of $9000/MWH to recover the annual revenue requirements of combustion turbine (CT) investment based on the parameters we collected for the California Energy Commission. It turns out to be about 20 to 30 hours per year. Even if the cost in Texas is 30% less, this is still more 15 hours annually, every single year or on average. (That has not been happening in Texas to date.) Note for other independent system operators (ISO) such as the California ISO (CAISO), the price cap is $1,000 to $2,000/MWH.

I then calculated the cost of a customer instead using a home generator to meet load during those hours assuming a life of 10 to 20 years on the generator. That cost should set a cap on the VOLL to residential customers as the opportunity cost for them. The average unit is about $200/kW and an expensive one is about $500/kW. That cost ranges from $3 to $5 per kWh or $3,000 to $5,000/MWH. (If storage becomes more prevalent, this cost will drop significantly.) And that’s for customers who care about periodic outages–most just ride out a distribution system outage of a few hours with no backup. (Of course if I experienced 20 hours a year of outage, I would get a generator too.) This calculation ignores the added value of using the generator for other distribution system outages created by events like a hurricane hitting every few years, as happens in Texas. That drives down this cost even further, making the $9,000/MWH ORDC adder appear even more distorted.

The second calculation I did was to look at the cost of an extended outage. I used the outages during Hurricane Harvey in 2017 as a useful benchmark event. Based on ERCOT and U.S. Energy Information Reports reports, it looks like 1.67 million customers were without power for 4.5 days. Using the Texas gross state product (GSP) of $1.9 trillion as reported by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, I calculated the economic value lost over 4.5 days, assuming a 100% loss, at $1.5 billion. If we assume that the electricity outage is 100% responsible for that loss, the lost economic value per MWH is just under $5,000/MWH. This represents the budget constraint on willingness to pay to avoid an outage. In other words, the Texas economy can’t afford to pay $9,000/MWH.

The recent set of rolling blackouts in Texas provides another opportunity to update this budget constraint calculation in a different circumstance. This can be done by determining the reduction in electricity sales and the decrease in state gross product in the period.

Using two independent methods, I come up with an upper bound of $5,000/MWH, and likely much less. One commentator pointed out that ERCOT would not be able achieve a sufficient planning reserve level at this price, but that statement is based on the premises that short-run hourly prices reflect full market values and will deliver the “optimal” resource mix. Neither is true.

This type of hourly pricing overemphasizes peak load reliability value and undervalues other attributes such as sustainability and resilience. These prices do not reflect the full incremental cost of adding new resources that deliver additional benefits during non-peak periods such as green energy, nor the true opportunity cost that is exercised when a generator is interconnected rather than during later operations. Texas has overbuilt its fossil-fueled generation thanks to this paradigm. It needs an external market based on long-run incremental costs to achieve the necessary environmental goals.

Chasing gold at the end of the rainbow: how reliance on hourly markets doesn’t spur generation investment

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Commentators have touted the Texas ERCOT market as the epitome of how a fully functioning hourly electricity market can deliver the economic signals needed to spur investment in new capacity. They further assert that this type of market can be technology neutral in what type of investment is made. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) largely adopted this position more than two decades ago when it initiated restructuring that led to the creation of these hourly markets, including the California Independent System Operator (CAISO). And FERC continues to take that stance, although it has allowed for short term capacity markets to backfill for reliability needs.

But now we hear that the Texas market is falling short in incenting new capacity investment. ERCOT which manages the Texas grid projects near term risks and a growing shortfall at least to 2024. At issue is the fact that waiting around for the gambler’s chance at price spike revenues doesn’t make a strong case for financing capital intensive generation, particularly if one’s own investment is likely to make those price spikes disappear. It’s like chasing the gold at the end of the rainbow!

This is another sign that hourly markets are not reliable indicators of market value, contrary to the view of proponents of those markets. The combination of the lumpiness of generation investment and the duration of that generation capital, how that new generation undermines the apparent value in the market, and the lack of political tolerance for failures in reliability or meeting environmental targets require that a much more holistic view of market value for these investments. The value of hedging risk, providing cost stability, improving reliability and resilience and reducing overall portfolio costs all need to be incorporated into a full valuation process.

Charging with the sun…really!

MITSUBISHI MOTOR SALES OF AMERICA, INC. CYPRESS CHARGING STATION

Severin Borenstein at the University of California’s Energy Institute at Haas posted on whether a consumer buying an electric vehicle was charging it with power from renewables. I have been considering the issue of how our short-run electricity markets are incomplete and misleading. I posted this response on that blog:

As with many arguments that look quite cohesive, it is based on key unstated premises that if called into question undermine the conclusions. I would relabel the “correct” perspective as the “conventional” which assumes that the resources at the margin are defined by short-run operational decisions. This is the basic premise of the FERC-designed power market framework–somehow all of those small marginal energy increases eventually add up into one large new powerplant. This is the standard economic assumption that a series of “putty” transactions in the short term will evolve into a long term “clay” investment. (It’s all of those calculus assumptions about continuity that drive this.) This was questionable in 1998 as it became apparent that the capacity market would have to run separately from the energy market, and is now even more questionable as we replace fossil fuel with renewables.

I would call the fourth perspective as “dynamic”. From this perspective these short run marginal purchases on the CAISO are for balancing to meet current demand. As Marc Joseph pointed out, all of the new incremental demand is being met in a completely separate market that only uses the CAISO as a form of a day to day clearinghouse–the bilateral PPAs. No load serving entity is looking to the CAISO as their backstop resource source. Those long term PPAs are almost universally renewables–even in states without RPS standards. In addition, fossil fueled plants–coal and gas–are being retired and replaced by solar and wind, and that is an additional marginal resource not captured in the CAISO market.

So when a consumer buys a new EV, that added load is being met with renewables added to either meet new load or replace retired fossil. Because these renewables have zero operating costs, they don’t show up in the CAISO’s “marginal” resources for simple accounting reasons, not for fundamental economic reasons. And when that consumer also adds solar panels at the same time, those panels don’t show up at all in the CAISO transactions and are ignored under the conventional view.

There is an issue of resource balancing costs in the CAISO incurred by one type of resource versus another, but that cost is only a subcomponent of the overall true marginal cost from a dynamic perspective.

So how we view the difference between “putty” and “clay” increments is key to assessing whether a consumer is charging their EV with renewables or not.

California already paid for utility assets once: Why do we have to do it again?

——renewablemix-cleangreengrid-642x300

Rather than focus on CCA procurement, the CPUC would better serve the state to use the provisions of AB 57 (e.g., PUC Section 454.5(b)(6)) and its other authorities, including those still in force from AB 1890 (1996). PG&E and SCE already collected $7 billion on an accelerated basis during the “competitive transition period” from 1998 to 2001 towards their legacy utility-owned generation resources such as Diablo Canyon, San Onofre and their hydropower generation.  SDG&E completely paid off its generation portfolio in 1999 this way. Further, PG&E had already recovered its entire investment in Diablo Canyon by December 31, 1997 prior to the start of the opening of the restructured market. (I tracked the CTC accounts throughout the period, reporting to the CEC in 2001, and calculated the return on investment in Diablo Canyon for settlement discussions in 1996.) If the Commission wanted to repay the debts incurred during the 2000-01 energy crisis, the better solution, which it did in part with SCE, would have been to simply establish a “regulatory asset” with no connection to the generating facilities which had already been paid off. As it is, customers-bundled and departed–are paying twice (and THREE times in the case of Diablo Canyon) for the same power plants.

The IOUs currently lack any real incentives to control their portfolio costs, as evidenced by their bundled portfolio plans for PG&E and SCE. Those plans say nothing about minimizing costs or managing risks except to avoid incurring shareholder penalties for missing the RPS mandates. In fact, PG&E has accrued a 3.3 cents per kilowatt-hour premium above the market value of its RPS portfolio to protect against a potential “price spike” between now and 2027. It is no wonder that customers have become unhappy with how the IOUs have managed their generation portfolios.

CCAs reach RPS targets with long-term PPAs

Joint CCA Notice of Ex Parte 10.24.16_CCS-RPS

As I listen to the opening of the joint California Customer Choice En Banc held by the CPUC and CEC, I hear Commissioners and speakers claiming that community choice aggregators (CCAs) are taking advantage of the current market and shirking their responsibilities for developing a responsible, resilient resource portfolio.

The CPUC’s view has two problems. The first is an unreasonable expectation that CCAs can start immediately as a full-grown organization with a complete procurement organization, and more importantly, a rock solid credit history. The second is how the CPUC has ignored the fact that the CCAs have already surpassed the state’s RPS targets  in most cases and that they have significant shares of long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs).

State law in fact penalizes excess procurement of RPS-eligible power by requiring that 65% of that specific portfolio be locked into long-term PPAs, regardless of the prudency of that policy. PG&E has already demonstrated that they have been unable to prudently manage its long-term portfolio, incurring a 3.3 cents per kilowatt-hour risk hedge premium on its RPS portfolio. (Admittedly, that provision could be interpreted to be 65% of the RPS target, e.g., 21.5% of a portfolio that has met the 33% RPS target, but that is not clear from the statute.)

 

Why the CPUC’s RA Market Report gives the wrong reliability price metric

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In its annual report on resource adequacy (RA) transactions, the CPUC reports the wrong result for the market price to be used for valuing capacity from the RA market data. The Commission’s decision issued in the PCIA rulemaking on establishing the CCA’s “exit fee” uses this value in error. In the CAISO energy and ancillary services markets, the market clearing price used to set the value of the energy portfolio is determined by the highest accepted bid in a single hour, and then averaged across all hours. In contrast, the average reported RA price in The 2017 Resource Adequacy Report incorrectly reports the average of all transactions. This would be equivalent to the CAISO reporting the average of all accepted bids, including those at zero or even negative, as the market clearing price.

The appropriate RA price metric is the highest RA transaction price for each month. This price represents the market equilibrium point at which a consumer is willing to pay the highest price given how low a price a supplier is willing to provide that quantity of the resource. (The other transactions are called “inframarginal” and such transactions are common in many markets.) In a full auction market, all transactions would clear at this single price, which is why the CAISO reports a single market clearing price for all transactions in a single hour. That should also be the case for the RA market price, except the time unit is a month.

Due to a lack of an auction for the moment, it is possible to manipulate the highest apparent price through a bilateral transaction. Instead, the Commission could choose a price near the highest point, but with sufficient market depth to mitigate potential manipulation. Using the 90th percentile transaction is one metric commonly used based on a quick survey of market price reports.

Commentary on CPUC Rate Design Workshop

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The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) held a two-day workshop on rate design principles for commercial and industrial customers. To the the extent possible, rates are designed in California to reflect the temporal changes in underlying costs–the “marginal costs” of power production and delivery.

Professor Severin Borenstein’s opening presentation doesn’t discuss a very important aspect of marginal costs that we have too long ignored in rate making. That’s the issue of “putty/clay” differences. This is an issue of temporal consistency in marginal cost calculation. The “putty” costs are those short term costs of operating the existing infrastructure. The “clay” costs are those of adding infrastructure which are longer term costs. Sometimes the operational costs can be substitutes for infrastructure. However we are now adding infrastructure (clay) in renewables have have negligible operating (putty) costs. The issue we now face is how to transition from focusing on putty to clay costs as the appropriate marginal cost signals.

Carl Linvill from the Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP) made a contrasting presentation that incorporated those differences in temporal perspectives for marginal costs.

Another issue raised by Doug Ledbetter of Opterra is that customers require certainty as well as expected returns to invest in energy-saving projects. We can have certainty for customers if the utilities vintage/grandfather rates and/or structures at the time they make the investment. Then rates / structures for other customers can vary and reflect the benefits that were created by those customers making investments.

Jamie Fine of EDF emphasized that rate design needs to focus on what is actionable by customers more so than on a best reflection of underlying costs. As an intervenor group representative, we are constantly having this discussion with utilities. Often when we make a suggestion about easing customer acceptance, they say “we didn’t think of that,” but then just move along with their original plan. The rise of DERs and CCAs are in part a response to that tone-deaf approach by the incumbent utilities.

Comment on “Renewables May Become the Netflix of the Energy Sector” | Greentech Media

The analogy to Netflix is fascinating. As GTM points out, Netflix started out competing with Blockbuster in video DVDs, but then spilled over into video streaming (BTW, a market that Enron famously thought it could corner in the last 1990s.) So Netflix is now competing with both cable and broadcast companies. One can see how renewables could jump out of just electric service to building space conditioning and water heating, and vehicle fueling. Tesla is already developing those options.

Source: Renewables May Become the Netflix of the Energy Sector | Greentech Media

Silverstein: If I’d written the DOE grid study recommendations | Repost from Utility Dive

Alison Silverstein, who drafted the technical portions of the DOE grid study, says its summary and recommendations missed key points on grid reliability and resilience.

Source: Silverstein: If I’d written the DOE grid study recommendations | Utility Dive

Lomborg has it wrong about California’s cap and trade program. 

Bjorn Lomborg, a Danish political scientist who has pushed for focusing spending on other pressing world needs over reducing climate change risk, has criticized the extension of California’s cap and trade program in the LA Times. I found two serious flaws in Lomborg’s analysis that undermine his conclusions.

The study that Lomberg cites about the electricity market impacts has not been reproduced since such extensive “contract reshuffling” can’t occur in the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) region or in the CAISO market. That’s just a simplistic modeling exercise not tied to reality. The fact is that thousands of megawatts of coal plants are retiring across the WECC at least in part in response to the cap & trade and renewables portfolio standards (RPS) adopted by California.

And then Lomberg writes “A smarter approach to climate policy — and one befitting California’s role as one of the most innovative states in the country — would be to focus on making green energy cheaper. ” Has Lomberg noticed that new solar and wind installations are now cheaper than new fossil-fueled plants? Contracts are being signed for less than 5 cents per kilowatt-hour–PG&E’s average cost for existing generation is close to 9 cents.

It’s as though Lomberg hasn’t updated his understanding of the energy industry since 2009 when the Copenhagen climate accord was signed.