Tag Archives: California

Another reason SB 775 is a bad idea: Virginia to establish cap-and-trade program in push to regulate carbon emissions | Utility Dive

California’s SB 775 would prohibit interaction with other states’ cap and trade programs. The best alternative to a federal program is a network of state markets.

“A cap-and-trade program in Virginia would be the third in the U.S., and buck direction from the White House to pull back on carbon regulation.”

Source: Virginia to establish cap-and-trade program in push to regulate carbon emissions | Utility Dive

Opening up California’s utility procurement process could lead to lower power prices

auction

California passed AB 57 in 2002 to make the power procurement process for electric utilities confidential (as well as subject only to upfront review rather than ongoing prudence standards). The result has been overly high prices locked in for decades.  A new study on the relative gains to landowners who sell the development rights for oil and gas development in Texas shows that using auctions creates more competition among multiple bidders than bilateral negotiations. As a result, landowners get higher prices for their development rights through an auction. The corollary is that California’s electric utilities probably could lower their power purchase costs by moving to public auctions instead. Yet another reason to repeal AB 57.

Building Drought Resilience in California’s Cities and Suburbs from PPIC

Then And Now: California's Drought Officially Declared To Be Over

M.Cubed partner David Mitchell is the lead author on this PPIC report that reviews the responses by urban agencies to the California’s recent drought and looks at the lessons learned. He’s speaking during a webinar on June 16 at noon. In addition, he co-authored an opinion article for the Sacramento Bee.

Clean energy too big to be shut down by Trump – San Francisco Chronicle

I’ve been struck by the lack of panic in the energy industry about President Trump’s decision. This article goes into that underlying confidence that the momentum appears unstoppable.

WASHINGTON — President Trump’s decision to abandon the Paris Accord will slow the battle against climate change in the U.S., but there’s too much momentum in the nation’s clean-energy economy to shut it down, energy experts say.

Source: Clean energy too big to be shut down by Trump – San Francisco Chronicle

The misguided fix to cap & trade

Meredith Fowlie at the Energy Institute at Haas (California’s Carbon Border Wall ) and Dallas Burtraw at RFF have taken on the specific issues in the proposal to replace California’s cap & trade program (CATP).

Yet there’s a bigger issue with SB 775: Why are we so focused on getting every last ton of GHG reduction out of California, when instead we should be focused on creating a system that can easily accommodate integrating with other jurisdictions and encourages others to join the effort? What California does alone is absolutely meaningless in changing climate change risk. It requires a truly global effort. Putting up border walls won’t accomplish this.

CAISO: Renewables served 42% of California demand on May 16, setting record | Utility Dive

During the 2 p.m. hour, renewables served more than 70% of power demand, setting another record in California.

Source: CAISO: Renewables served 42% of California demand on May 16, setting record | Utility Dive

Proposed TOU rate revisions are “fighting the last war” in California

p58cht

California’s investor-owned utilities (IOUs) have asserted that the underlying costs molding time variant or time of use (TOU) rate structures should be largely, or even exclusively, derived based on conventional fossil generation costs. The IOUs rely on “net load” to determine TOU prices, calculated by subtracting all load met by renewables, nuclear and hydropower generation—the majority of the utilities’ generation fleets.

In theory, net load is the portion of the load served by fossil-fueled generation that has the highest short-run operating costs, and therefore is “marginal.” The infamous “duck curve” shown above depicts the net load (not the metered load.) Yet, the marginal energy generation for most load is no longer served by natural gas; it is now met by renewable energy contracts. The utilities’ net load approach ignores the bulk of their true marginal costs to serve added load, which arise from procuring renewables.[1] The IOUs’ resource procurement has been dominated by adding solar, wind, biofuels, and other renewables since at least 2006 to meet the state’s renewable portfolio standard (RPS), first at 20 percent, then 33 percent, and soon 50 percent.

The tunnel-vision focus on net, rather than the entire, load is especially problematic in the context of State policy to phase-down fossil fuel generation. Eventually, natural gas production will even more significantly diminish, and could disappear from the grid entirely, leaving no price-setting metric under this paradigm. Insistence on the net load approach in the face of this transformation is akin to evaluating the economics of ridesharing based on the exclusive cost of taxis, without consideration of Uber® and Lyft®.

Once fossil-fuel resources are used minimally – an explicit state goal reflected in SB 350 – and potentially no longer on the margin, it is unclear what price benchmark the utilities will propose to set time-variant rates.  Continuing the trend toward fewer fossil-fuel resources is already reflected in pending legislation in Sacramento that proposes a clean-peak standard – AB 1405[2] – and a 100 percent Renewable Portfolio Standard—SB 584.[3] Relying solely on the cost of generation resources that State policy plans to phaseout to define TOU periods is inconsistent with good, long-term, ratemaking principles.  Instead, marginal energy generation costs should be calculated, at least in part, from a set of recent RPS-eligible PPAs, weighted by time of delivery.

Likewise, the marginal energy costs derived using the net load method, which drive the proposed shifts in TOU periods, reflect less than one-third of total average utility rates. The IOUs do not explain why cost differences within a modest component of overall rates should steer determination of TOU periods.

Further, it is not clear why the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) should rely on a speculative forecast about load shapes in 2024—seven years from now—to set today’s TOU periods. As the CPUC is well aware, the electricity system is changing rapidly along many dimensions. Infusion of utility-scale renewables, which is driving the IOUs’ rate analyses, is but one factor. Increasing amounts of storage and electric vehicles, shifting work patterns, and other social and economic factors will substantially influence load profiles over the next decade. In 2006, few energy experts foresaw stagnant, or even falling, electricity demand; there is even greater uncertainty today.

[1]This perspective excludes contributions made by utility-scale renewables that meet most of the remaining load, and by customer-side resources.

[2] See http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB1405

[3] See https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB584