Tag Archives: community solar gardens

AB1139 would undermine California’s efforts on climate change

Assembly Bill 1139 is offered as a supposed solution to unaffordable electricity rates for Californians. Unfortunately, the bill would undermine the state’s efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by crippling several key initiatives that rely on wider deployment of rooftop solar and other distributed energy resources.

  • It will make complying with the Title 24 building code requiring solar panel on new houses prohibitively expensive. The new code pushes new houses to net zero electricity usage. AB 1139 would create a conflict with existing state laws and regulations.
  • The state’s initiative to increase housing and improve affordability will be dealt a blow if new homeowners have to pay for panels that won’t save them money.
  • It will make transportation electrification and the Governor’s executive order aiming for 100% new EVs by 2035 much more expensive because it will make it much less economic to use EVs for grid charging and will reduce the amount of direct solar panel charging.
  • Rooftop solar was installed as a long-term resource based on a contractual commitment by the utilities to maintain pricing terms for at least the life of the panels. Undermining that investment will undermine the incentive for consumers to participate in any state-directed conservation program to reduce energy or water use.

If the State Legislature wants to reduce ratepayer costs by revising contractual agreements, the more direct solution is to direct renegotiation of RPS PPAs. For PG&E, these contracts represent more than $1 billion a year in excess costs, which dwarfs any of the actual, if any, subsidies to NEM customers. The fact is that solar rooftops displaced the very expensive renewables that the IOUs signed, and probably led to a cancellation of auctions around 2015 that would have just further encumbered us.

The bill would force net energy metered (NEM) customers to pay twice for their power, once for the solar panels and again for the poor portfolio management decisions by the utilities. The utilities claim that $3 billion is being transferred from customers without solar to NEM customers. In SDG&E’s service territory, the claim is that the subsidy costs other ratepayers $230 per year, which translates to $1,438 per year for each NEM customer. But based on an average usage of 500 kWh per month, that implies each NEM customer is receiving a subsidy of $0.24/kWh compared to an average rate of $0.27 per kWh. In simple terms, SDG&E is claiming that rooftop solar saves almost nothing in avoided energy purchases and system investment. This contrasts with the presumption that energy efficiency improvements save utilities in avoided energy purchases and system investments. The math only works if one agrees with the utilities’ premise that they are entitled to sell power to serve an entire customer’s demand–in other words, solar rooftops shouldn’t exist.

Finally, this initiative would squash a key motivator that has driven enthusiasm in the public for growing environmental awareness. The message from the state would be that we can only rely on corporate America to solve our climate problems and that we can no longer take individual responsibility. That may be the biggest threat to achieving our climate management goals.

Microgrids could cost 10% of undergrounding PG&E’s wires

One proposed solution to reducing wildfire risk is for PG&E to put its grid underground. There are a number of problems with undergrounding including increased maintenance costs, seismic and flooding risks, and problems with excessive heat (including exploding underground vaults). But ignoring those issues, the costs could be exorbitant-greater than anyone has really considered. An alternative is shifting rural service to microgrids. A high-level estimate shows that using microgrids instead could cost less than 10% of undergrounding the lines in regions at risk. The CPUC is considering a policy shift to promote this type of solution and has new rulemaking on promoting microgrids.

We can put this in context by estimating costs from PG&E’s data provided in its 2020 General Rate Case, and comparing that to its total revenue requirements. That will give us an estimate of the rate increase needed to fund this effort.

PG&E has about 107,000 miles of distribution voltage wires and 18,500 in transmission lines. PG&E listed 25,000 miles of distribution lines being in wildfire risk zones. The the risk is proportionate for transmission this is another 4,300 miles. PG&E has estimated that it would cost $3 million per mile to underground (and ignoring the higher maintenance and replacement costs). And undergrounding transmission can cost as much as $80 million per mile. Using estimates provided to the CAISO and picking the midpoint cost adder of four to ten times for undergrounding, we can estimate $25 million per mile for transmission is reasonable. Based on these estimates it would cost $75 billion to underground distribution and $108 billion for transmission, for a total cost of $183 billion. Using PG&E’s current cost of capital, that translates into annual revenue requirement of $9.1 billion.

PG&E’s overall annual revenue requirement are currently about $14 billion and PG&E has asked for increases that could add another $3 billion. Adding $9.1 billion would add two-thirds (~67%) to PG&E’s overall rates that include both distribution and generation. It would double distribution rates.

This begs two questions:

  1. Is this worth doing to protect properties in the affected urban-wildlands interface (UWI)?
  2. Is there a less expensive option that can achieve the same objective?

On the first question, if we look the assessed property value in the 15 counties most likely to be at risk (which includes substantial amounts of land outside the UWI), the total assessed value is $462 billion. In other words, we would be spending 16% of the value of the property being protected. The annual revenue required would increase property taxed by over 250%, going from 0.77% to 2.0%.

Which turns us to the second question. If we assume that the load share is proportionate to the share of lines at risk, PG&E serves about 18,500 GWh in those areas. The equivalent cost per unit for undergrounding would be $480 per MWh.

The average cost for a microgrid in California based on a 2018 CEC study is $3.5 million per megawatt. That translates to $60 per MWh for a typical load factor. In other words a microgrid could cost one-eighth of undergrounding. The total equivalent cost compared to the undergrounding scenario would be $13 billion. This translates to an 8% increase in PG&E rates.

To what extent should we pursue undergrounding lines versus shifting to microgrid alternatives in the WUI areas? Should we encourage energy independence for these customers if they are on microgrids? How should we share these costs–should locals pay or should they be spread over the entire customer base? Who should own these microgrids: PG&E or CCAs or a local government?

 

 

 

 

Problems with “Residential storage can undercut benefits of rooftop solar, says new study” | (A response to a Utility Dive article)

A new study in Nature Energy finds storing rooftop solar can increase emissions and energy consumption.

My thoughts: Here’s the key statement for the finding in this report: “based on today’s Texas grid mix, which is primarily made up of fossil fuels.” If the either the marginal generation on the grid is low or no GHG (e.g., renewables overgeneration which is an increasing problem in California) or the connection to the grid is cut or restricted (e.g., in a microgrid), then this premise doesn’t hold.

This study relies on fossil fueled generation being the marginal energy source. It also focuses solely on operational changes with existing resources. The appropriate frame is looking at the change in generation investment with and without storage, so for example more renewables become cost effective with storage so the overall generation mix changes.

The second problem is that most of the production cost models are yet incapable of capturing reduction in flexible capacity use. That’s why the California Energy Commission has had DNV and LBNL working on modeling those resources. So the emission savings are underestimated.

The third problem is that savings in residual unit commitment (RUC) is underestimated in the models. These are gas units running on standby with no-load, to be available the next day for ramping, load following or reliability. Storage reduces the need for these resources as well. NREL recently released a study on the value of storage that captures this benefit.

If these findings are valid, then the existing Helms pumped storage plant is also increasing GHG emissions. One could go so far as to say that the value of pondage hydropower storage may be so diminished that relicensing conditions that require run of river operations may have little effect on costs and GHG emissions.

Source: Residential storage can undercut benefits of rooftop solar, says new study | Utility Dive

Community choice spreading across California

Yolo County and the City of Davis became the latest community to approve a CCE (for community choice energy, an alternative moniker to the legalistic community choice aggregation). I sat on the advisory committee assessing options and the business case is strong for the viability of this option. This is the leading edge of a wave of CCEs across California. The combination of market conditions, falling renewable power costs, recognition of changes in the electricity market, and dissatisfaction with the incumbent utilities is pushing broad community coalitions to take the leap.

ca-cca-map-solo-10-10-16-e1476219431587To date three communities have operating CCE’s, with MCE starting first in 2010. MCE is made up of not only Marin County, but also Napa County, and the City of Richmond and Benecia. It also is considering adding new members. It currently has 17 voting communities. Sonoma Clean Power followed in 2014, and is considering adding Lake and Mendocino counties.  The City of Lancaster started in late 2015 in SCE’s service territory. Peninsula Clean Energy, composed of San Mateo County and its cities, kicked off service in 2016.  In addition, San Francisco has approved a CCE but has had various political barriers to getting off the ground.

Here’s a couple websites that show maps and lists of what counties and cities are pursuing CCAs (the lists are slightly different).

 

Other communities in the midst of either approving or implementing new CCEs include:

Alameda County

Contra Costa County – considering joining Alameda or MCE, or going it alone

Humboldt County as Redwood Coast Energy Authority – considering joining SCP or going alone

South Bay Cities of Los Angeles County as South Bay Clean Power

Los Angeles County

Monterey, Santa Cruz and San Benito Counties and their cities as Monterey Bay Community Power

Riverside and San Bernardino Counties – issued RFP for joint study

San Diego County

City of San Diego – issued RFP for a study

City of Solana Beach

Santa Clara County and 11 cities as Silicon Valley CCE Partners – starting late 2016

City of San Jose – exploring joining SVCCEP or going alone

Santa Barbara CountySan Luis Obispo County and Ventura County – released study on feasibility and options

City of Walnut Creek – considering joining with Contra Costa or going alone

 

All of this activity has serious implications for IOU purchasing and contract management going forward, CPUC regulation and overall procurement transparency. The IOUs and CPUC have operated in black box to date claiming that confidentiality is necessary to prevent market manipulation. Yet with all of these CCEs likely operating as open books, everyone will have the market information that the IOUs claim is so vital to protect. This is likely to open up IOU PPAs to greater scrutinty–attention that neither the IOUs or the CPUC probably want.

Reaction to Is “Community Choice” Electric Supply a Solution or a Problem?

Severin Borenstein at the Energy Institute @ Haas wrote a good summary of the issues around community choice aggregation.

Source: Is “Community Choice” Electric Supply a Solution or a Problem?

I am on the City of Davis’ Community Choice Energy Advisory Committee and have been looking at these issues closely for a year. I had my own reactions to this post:

First, in California the existing and proposed CCEs (there are probably a dozen in process at the moment to add to the 3 existing ones) universally offer a higher “green” % product than the incumbent IOU, most often a 50% RPS product. And although MCE and SCP started out relying on RECs of various types to start out, they all are phasing out most of those by 2017. I think most will offer a 100% product as well.

The reason that these CCE’s are able to offer lower rates than the IOUs at a lower RPS is that the IOUs prematurely contracted long for renewables in anticipation of the 2020 goal. In fact, the penalty for failing to meet the RPS in any given year is so low, that the prudent strategy by an IOU would have been to risk being short in each year and contract for the year ahead instead of locking in too many 20+ year PPAs. At least one reason why this happened is that the IOUs require confidentiality by any reviewers and no connections to any competing procurement decisions. As a result the outside reviewers couldn’t be up to speed on the rapidly falling PPA prices. The CPUC has made a huge mistake on this point (and the CEC has rightfully harassed the CPUC over this policy.)

CCE’s also offer the ability to craft a broader range of rate offerings to customers–even flat 20 year rates that can compete with solar roofs on the main issue that customers really care about: price guarantees. In addition, CCE’s are more likely to be to nimbly adjust a rapidly changing utility landscape. CCE’s are much less likely to care about falling loads because their earnings aren’t dependent on continued service.

It’s also to recognize the difference between local government general services (e.g., safety and public protection, social services, regulation, etc.) and enterprise services (e.g., utilities of all sorts). In general, the latter are as efficient as IOUs (except LADWP which illustrates the INefficiency created by overlarge organizations). So one can’t make a broad generalization about local government problems and how they might apply in this situation. The fact is that almost all of the existing and new CCEs are or will be JPAs, which are often even leaner. (Lancaster is the exception.)

Finally, Severin made this statement:

“Whatever regulatory mandates, managerial mistakes, or incompetence occurred in the past, customers switching to a CCA should not be allowed to shift their share of costs from past decisions onto other ratepayers.”

I have to disagree to a certain exent with this statement. Am I forced to pay for the past incompetencies of GM or GE or any other corporation? Yes, utilities have a higher assurance of return on their investments, but no where is it written that it is “ironclad.” Those utilities had an assurance first as the sole legal provider and then as the provider of last resort, but that’s eroding. In California, the CTC was a political deal to get the IOUs out of the way. The fact is in California that the CPUC abrogated its responsibility to oversee these decisions on behalf of ratepayers with the encouragement of the IOUs. If the IOUs want to retain their customers, then they should be forced to compete with the CCEs (and DA LSEs.) It’s time to reopen this matter.

And to add a bit more:

The logic of this statement is that ANY customer who leaves the system, including moving to another area, state or nation, should have to continue to pay these stranded costs. Why should we draw the line arbitrarily at whether they happen to still get distribution services even though the generation services have been completely severed? Particularly if someone moves from say, San Francisco to Palo Alto, that customer still relies on PG&E’s transmission system and its hydro system for ancillary services. Why not charge that Palo Alto customer a non-by-passable charge? And why shouldn’t it be reciprocal? Relying on “political practicality” is not an answer. Either ALL customers are tethered forever, or no customers are required to meet this obligation.

 

Is the Future of Electricity Generation Really Distributed?

Severin Borenstein at UC Energy Institute blogs about the push for distributed solar, perhaps at the expense of other cost-effective renewables development. My somewhat contrary comment on that is here: https://energyathaas.wordpress.com/2015/05/04/is-the-future-of-electricity-generation-really-distributed/#comment-8092

Davis to look at Community Choice Energy

After calling a halt to the deeper exploration of an electric publicly-owned utility, the city has turned to an easier mountain to climb in community choice energy aggregation (now remonikered to CCE). The original POU study briefly looked at the CCE option and moved past (and in my opinion used too generic of an approach to assess the POU path with some incorrect assumptions and didn’t consider the rapidly changing electricity market). Several direct access providers have approached the city and interested parties about helping implement a CCE. The citizen’s committee will look at whether a CCE opens up new value for the city and its citizens, and whether to go it alone or to join another CCE. Marin Clear Energy and Sonoma Clean Power both have participation rates over 90%. I will be sitting on that committee as an appointee via the Coalition for Local Power. (I also sit on the Utilities Rates Advisory Committee which has an appointee.)

Perhaps one of the most attractive features is that Davis can gain control of the energy efficiency funds available from the public good charge by preparing a plan specific to the city. Fortunately, the framework for that plan is already underway with a prompt from the Georgetown University Energy Prize.

Smart, clean and local energy technologies for Davis

Second in a series published in the Davis Enterprise on how the City of Davis can address its energy future:

Smart, clean and local energy technologies for Davis

Making Community Solar Gardens Work

California has been quite successful at encouraging the development of (1) large utility-scale renewables through the renewables portfolio standard (RPS) and other measures and (2) small-scale, single structure solar generation through the California Solar Initiative (CSI) and measures such as net energy metering (NEM).  However, there have been numerous market and regulatory barriers to developing and deploying the “in-between” community-scale and neighborhood-scale renewables that hold substantial promise.

Community-scale and neighborhood-scale distributed generation (DG) includes some technologies that simply are not cost-effective at the small scale of a single house or business, but are not large enough to justify the transaction costs of participating in the larger wholesale electricity market.  These resources, such as “community solar gardens”, can meet the demands of many customers who cannot take advantage of adding renewables at their location and can also reduce investment in expensive new transmission projects. Examples of these types of projects are parking structure-scale solar photovoltaics, solar-thermal generation and space cooling, and biogas and biomass projects, some of which could provide district heating.  Technology costs are falling so rapidly that these mid-scale projects are becoming competitive with utility-scale resources when transmission cost savings are factored in. SB 43 (Wolk 2013) recognizes that the promise of mid-scale renewables has not been realized.

In response to SB 43, each of the large investor-owned utilities–PG&E, SCE and SDG&E–have filed proposed tariffs with names such as Enhanced Community Renewables Program or Share the Sun. I filed testimony in the PG&E and SCE cases on behalf of the Sierra Club addressing shortcomings in those programs that would inhibit development of community solar gardens. SDG&E’s proposal, while not perfect, better meets the law’s objectives. After the hearings, the CPUC postponed a proposed decision from the July 1 deadline to October.

SB 43’s requirement that the investor-owned utilities “provide support for enhanced community renewables programs” is a critical step forward for California’s distributed energy goals.  The CSI is the state’s premier distributed generation program.  In SB 43 the Legislature expressed its intent that the “green tariff shared renewables program seeks to build on the success of the California Solar Initiative by expanding access to all eligible renewable energy resources to all ratepayers who are currently unable to access the benefits of onsite generation.”  SB 43 advances the success of the CSI into the area of multifamily residential and multitenant commercial properties and introduces all types of renewable energy resources.  Customers who, for various reasons, cannot benefit from the current net metering programs, will be able to benefit through SB 43.

The Legislature clearly intends for this program to lead to a transformation in the energy market akin to the success for single customers of the CSI. This necessary market transformation extends to multifamily and commercial lease properties that are currently beyond the CSI and Self Generation Incentive Programs (SGIP). The Commission should ensure that utilities’ programs under SB 43 provides the market transformation that is necessary for this underserved segment.

State regulations calls for all new residential dwellings to consume zero-net energy (ZNE) by 2020, and all new commercial properties by 2030.  Fully implementing the market transformation identified in SB 43 is one of the obvious means to achieve this target.  The CSI option has already facilitated many examples of feasible ZNE single-family homes using renewables well ahead of the 2020 deadline.  There are several market barriers to integrating renewables in a similar manner on multifamily and commercial leased properties and on single-family that are not favorably located or that have other impediments.

A properly-designed community solar garden program should provide a critical work-around for the split-incentive problem that has plagued local renewable development in California.  The split-incentive problem arises from the fact that multi-tenant structures, both commercial and residential, may not be able to implement solar or other renewable resources due to the fact that lessees are not the owners of the shared space where renewables could be sited.  The problem of split-incentives between landlords and tenants has long been recognized, and has been the focus of energy efficiency programs.

As a corollary, the Commission should provide individual developers and property owners the opportunity to integrate energy efficiency and DG measures to achieve the best mix for meeting environmental and economic goals. Each project is unique so that a “one size fits all” approach that requires sale of all output into the wholesale market with buyback from customers who may have no connection with the project will only discourage enhanced development.

For distributed generation to expand in California there must be a cost-effective path for residential and commercial tenants, as well as not-well-situated buildings, to install solar and other renewables and share the costs among other customers. The focus to date has been on either utility-scale or single-building scale projects, but the most promise may be in mid-scale projects that can serve a community or a neighborhood cost-effectively through a combination of scale economies and avoided transmission and distribution investment.  But to achieve this objective requires changes from current utility practices.

An update: Here’s the link to the decision on this CPUC case issued in January. And here’s the link to scoping memo for the phase of this proceeding.