I talked to the California Association of Sanitation Agencies in San Diego on the drought situation, its economic impacts and available resources including recycled or “recovered” water. My presentation is here.
Tag Archives: California
Equity issues in TOU rate design
I attended the Center for Research into Regulated Industries (CRRI) Western Conference last week, which includes many of the economists working on various energy regulatory issues in California. A persistent theme was the interrelationship of time-varying rates (TVR) and development of distributed generation like rooftop solar. One session was even entitled “optimal rates.” We presented a paper on developing the proper perspectives and criteria in valuing distributed solar resources in another session. (More on that in another post.)
With the pending CPUC decision in the residential ratemaking rulemaking, due July 3, time of use rates (TOU) rates were at the top of everyone’s mind. (With PG&E violations of the ex parte rules, the utilities were cautious about who they were presenting with at least one Commission advisor attending. At least one presentation was scotched for that reason.) Various results were presented, and the need for different design elements urged on efficiency grounds. In the end though I was struck most by two equity issues that seem to have been overlooked.
First, various studies have shown that TOU rates deliver larger savings for customers who have various types of automated response equipment such as smart thermostats (e.g., NEST) or smart appliances. Those customers will see bigger bill savings and may find that doing so is more convenient and comfortable. An underlying premise in these studies is that the customer is the decision maker. But for 45% of California’s residents–renters–that is not the case. As a result tenants, who tend to have lower incomes, are likely to be subsidizing home owners who are better equipped to benefit from TOU rates.
Tenants must rely on landlords to make those necessary investments. Landlords don’t pay the bills or realize the direct savings in what is called the “split incentive” problem. And landlords may be concerned that future tenants might not like the commitments that come with the new smart devices. For example, signing up for PG&E’s SmartAC program can face this barrier.
So in considering residential customer impacts, the CPUC should address the likely differential in opportunities and benefits between owner-customers and tenant-customers. Solutions might include rate design differences, or moving toward a model where energy service providers (ESP or ESCo) take over appliance ownership in multifamily buildings. This split incentive is endemic across many programs such as the solar initiative and energy efficiency.
Second, a fixed charge have been proposed to address the anticipated impact of solar net energy metering. The majority of costs to be covered are for the “customer services” that run from the flnal line transformer to the meter. (I’ve been focused on this segment while representing the Western Manufactured Housing Communities Association (WMA) on master-metering issues.) However, the investments in customer services are not uniform across residences. For older homes, the services or “line extensions” may have already been paid off (e.g., most homes built before 1975), and with inflation, the costs for newer homes can be substantially higher.
The fixed charge would be based on one of two methods. In current rate cases, the new or “marginal” cost for a line extension is the starting point of the calculation, and usually the cost is scaled up from that. However, given the depreciation and inflation, the utilities will receive much more revenue than what they are entitled to under regulated returns. In the second method, the average cost for all services will be applied to all customers. This solves the problem of excess revenues for the utility, but it does not address the subsidies that flow from customers in older homes to those in newer ones. Because the residents of older homes tend to be tenants and have lower incomes, this again is a regressive distribution of costs. Solutions might include no fixed charge at all, differences in rates by house vintage, or discounts in the fixed charge as SMUD has instituted.
Regardless, these types of subsidies flow the wrong direction.
Assessing the economic impacts of drought regulations
M.Cubed was asked by the State Water Resources Control Board to prepare an economic assessment of the emergency regulations ordered by the Governor to reduce municipal water use by 25%. We gathered a team that included Roger Mann of RMann Economics, Tom Wegge of TCW Economics, Richard Howitt and Duncan MacEwan of ERA Economics, and prepared the report in about two weeks. The SWRCB included a summary of those findings in its regulatory digest.
The innovative aspect of our study is to steer away from a single point probabilistic estimate of the benefits of the regulations and instead to focus on the potential vulnerability and consequences of the risk of continued drought in the future.
The EO is intended to address potentially significant economic vulnerabilities – risks – rather than statistical or probabilistic expectations. If the drought and high temperatures continue in California, water saved as a result of the order will become increasingly valuable. Under these circumstances, costs estimated to be associated with the EO this year could be more than exceeded by greater adverse impacts next year if the EO had not been issued.
Australia had an extended drought that lasted 10 years before ending in 2012 that cut 1.6% off its GDP. For California that would be $35 billion in a single year which is multiples of the range of costs we estimated for the regulations. In other words, the probability of continued drought would have to be less than 4% to make this option uneconomic.
We also pointed out that while the water utilities will lose revenues this year, as mostly public agencies, they will have to make up those losses in the future. For this reason, those revenue losses should be treated as eventual economic costs.
Legal Planet: California Supreme Court to review San Diego SB 375 climate change ruling
I blogged earlier on the implications of this case. The UCLA/Boalt Law Schools blog Legal Planet has more on this review.
Energy at Haas: One university’s attempt to reduce energy waste at work
A look at how commercial and institutional building energy use can be reduced by providing price signals.
PG&E to release 65,000 emails since 2010
PG&E in the wake of more revelations about ex parte contacts with CPUC commissioners and staff is releasing 65,000 emails over the period from 2010. This should make for some interesting reading by interested parties. Is there anyone out their who might like to cooperatively compile a readable database?
SANDAG, Executive Orders and California Policies
In a rather earthshaking ruling, California’s Fourth District Court of Appeals ruled that the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) must comply with the Governor Schwarzenegger’s Executive Order S-3-05 to “by 2050, reduce GHG emissions to 80 percent below 1990 levels.” SANDAG had completed its 2050 Regional Transportation Plan using AB 32 as its primary compliance hurdle. AB 32 “requires California to reduce its GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.” SB 375 required that metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) such as SANDAG develop sustainable community strategies (SCS) that reduce GHG emissions by an amount allocated by the California Air Resources Board to each MPO. SANDAG’s RTP is its SCS.
This is the first time that an EO has been held at legally binding on local agency actions. Governors have issued plenty of EOs before but they’ve been taken as providing policymaking and rulemaking guidance to the Governor’s appointees in various agencies. This decision raises the question whether those other EOs will now carry much more weight? And if governors issue conflicting EOs, which one is currently in force? What if an EO conflicts with state law passed by the Legislature?
On climate change, governors have issued seven such EOs. The Governor recently issued an EO calling for substantial water use reductions in the drought. Is the EO from 2008 still in force? The Energy Action Plan EO from 2004 calls for several specific actions by state agencies, many of them undertaken but necessarily on the timeline specified. Should the 33% renewable portfolio standard (RPS) be implemented along the lines of state law or the EO? A bit of research could show many more of these types of examples.
SANDAG is appealing the decision the State Supreme Court. How various interests align will be interesting.
Questions yet to be answered from the CAISO Symposium
While attending the CAISO Stakeholder Symposium last week I had rush of questions, not all interconnected, about how we manage the transition to the new energy future. I saw two very different views about how the grid might be managed–how will this be resolved? How do we consider path dependence in choosing supporting and “bridge” resources? How do we provide differential reliability to customers? How do we allow utilities to invest beyond the meter?
Jesse Knight, former CPUC Commissioner and now chairman at SDG&E and SCG, described energy utilities as the “last monopoly” in the face of a rapidly changing economic landscape. (Water utilities may have something to say about that.) SDG&E is ahead of the other utilities in recognizing the rise of the decentralized peer-to-peer economy. On the other hand, Clark Gellings from EPRI described a world in which the transmission operator would have to see “millions” of nodes, both loads and small generators, to operate a robust network. This view is consistent with the continued central management implied by the utility distribution planners at the CPUC’s distribution planning OIR workshop. At the end of the symposium, 3 of the 4 panelist said that the electricity system would be unrecognizable to Thomas Edison. I wonder if Alexander Graham Bell would recognize our telecommunications system?
One question posed to the first “townhall” panel asked what role natural gas would have in the transition to more renewables. I am not aware of any studies conducted on whether and how choices about generation technology today commits us to decisions in the future. Path dependence is an oft overlooked aspect of planning. We can’t make decisions independent of how we chose in the past. That’s why it’s so difficult to move away from fossil fuel dependence now–we committed to it decades ago. We shouldn’t ignore path dependence going forward. Building gas plants now may commit us to using gas for decades until the financial investments are recovered. We may be able to buy our way out through stranded asset payments, but we learned once before that wasn’t a particularly attractive approach. Using forethought and incorporating flexibility requires careful planning.
And along those lines in our breakout session, another question was posed about how to resolve the looming threat of “overgeneration” from renewables, particularly solar. Much of the problem might be resolved by charging EVs during the day, but it’s unlikely that a sizable number of plug-in hybrids and BEVs will be on the road before the mid-2020s. So the question becomes should we invest in gas-fired generation or battery or pumped storage, both of which have 20-30 year economic lives, or try to find other shorter lived transitions including curtailment contracts or demand response technologies until EVs arrive on the scene? It might even be cost effective to provide subsidies to accelerate adoption of EVs so as to avoid long-lived investments that may become prematurely obsolete.
Pricing for differential reliability among customers also came up. Often ignored in the reliability debate at the CAISO is that the vast majority of outages are at the distribution level. We appear to be overinvested in transmission and generation reliability at the expense of maintaining the integrity of the local grid. We could have system reliability prices that reflect costs of providing flexible service to follow on-site renewable generation. However the utilities already recover most of the capital costs of providing those services through rate of return regulation. The market prices are suppressed (as they are in the real time market where the IOUs dump excess power) so we can’t expect to see good price signals, yet.
Several people talked about partnerships with the utilities in investing in equipment beyond the meter. But the question is will a utility be willing to facilitate such investments if they degrade the value of its current investment in the grid? Fiduciary responsibility under traditional return on capital regulation says only if the cost of the new technology is higher so as to generate higher returns than the current grid investment. That doesn’t sound like a popular recipe for a new energy future. Instead, we need to come up with creative means of utility shareholders participating in the new marketplace without forcing them down the old regulatory path.
Margaret Jolly from ConEd noted that the stakeholders were holding conversations on the new future but “the customer was not in the room.” Community, political and business leaders who know how electricity is used were not highly evident, and certainly didn’t make any significant statements. I’ve written before about offering more rate options to customers. I wanted to hear more from Ellen Struck about the Pecan Street study, but her comments focused on the industry situation, not customers’ behaviors and choices.
What are the missing questions in California’s distribution planning OIR?
The CPUC has opened a long awaited rulemaking to revisit (or maybe visit for the first time!) how utilities should plan their distribution investments to better integrate with distributed energy resources (DER). State law now requires the utilities to file distribution plans by next July. But the CPUC may want to consider some deeper questions while formulating its policies.
To date the utilities have pretty much been able to make such investments with little oversight. For one client, AECA, we submitted testimony pointing out that PG&E had consistently overforecasted demand and used that demand to justify new distribution investment that probably is unneeded. Based on a corrected forecast that recognizes that that PG&E’s (and the state’s) demand has turned downward since 2007, PG&E’s loads don’t return to 2007 levels until at least 2014. (We found a similar pattern in SCE’s 2012 GRC filings.)
Both PG&E and SCE justified new investment based on phantom load growth, but they would have been better served to show what investment might be required for the evolving electricity market. SCE has responded with the Living Pilot that tests out how to best integrate preferred resources.
The CPUC is relying on Paul De Martini’s More than Smart paper as a roadmap for the rulemaking. The CPUC has asked a number of questions to be addressed by September 4 with replies September 17. A workshop is to be held September 18.Beyond these questions, two more questions come to mind.
First, who will be allowed to play in the DER world? The OIR asks about non-IOU ownership of distribution lines, particularly related to microgrids, but it doesn’t consider the flip side–can utilities or affiliates participate in the DER market? Setting market rules in the face of rapid evolution and uncertainty, current participants will look to protect their current interests unless they are shown a clear opportunity to gain the benefits of a new market. The CPUC ignores the political economy of rulemaking at our risk.
The second is how is this proceeding to be integrated with the multitude of other proceedings at the CPUC that set various resource targets? The LTPP, energy efficiency, demand response and solar initiatives, along with others, all seem to run on parallel tracks with little in the way of interactive feedback. Megawatt targets seem to be set arbitrarily with little evaluation of comparative resource costs and effectiveness, and more importantly, how these resources might best integrate with each other. How are the utilities to adapt to the spread of DER if the CPUC hasn’t considered how much DER might be installed?
Both of these questions are about market functionality. Who are the likely participants? What are their incentives to act in different situations? How would the CPUC prefer that then act? How are price signals to be coordinated to create the preferred incentives? The system investment and operation rules are a necessary component of anticipating the market evolution, but they are not sufficient. California ignored the incentives of market participants in the previous restructuring experiment, at the cost of $20 to $40 billion. We should take heed of what we’ve learned from the past about the paradigm we should use to approach this impending change.
Understanding the Challenges of Modeling AB 32 Policy
A summary of the review of the AB 32 Scoping Plan we conducted in 2008 for EDF.
Environmental & Energy Valuation News
The Aspen Environmental Group, M.Cubed for Environmental Defense / by Richard J. McCann
http://www.edf.org/documents/8902_AB32%20EconModeling%20M3%20final.pdf (full report)
http://www.edf.org/documents/8901_AB32%20AspenEnv%20Modeling%20PolicySum.pdf (summary)
[From press release] A new study released today concludes that state-of-the-science economic models, including those used for the California Air Resources Board’s economic analyses of California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32), are not capable of simulating the fundamental changes in California’s economy that AB 32 measures are likely to cause. While critics of ARB claim that costs might be underestimated, this new study shows that many benefits also are not represented by models and more modeling isn’t as useful as consideration of lessons from prior policies and economics literature.
In the new study, Dr. McCann reveals that current techniques…
View original post 60 more words

