Tag Archives: M.Cubed

Understanding the Challenges of Modeling AB 32 Policy

A summary of the review of the AB 32 Scoping Plan we conducted in 2008 for EDF.

clotworthy's avatarEnvironmental & Energy Valuation News

The Aspen Environmental Group, M.Cubed for Environmental Defense / by Richard J. McCann
http://www.edf.org/documents/8902_AB32%20EconModeling%20M3%20final.pdf (full report)
http://www.edf.org/documents/8901_AB32%20AspenEnv%20Modeling%20PolicySum.pdf (summary)

[From press release] A new study released today concludes that state-of-the-science economic models, including those used for the California Air Resources Board’s economic analyses of California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32), are not capable of simulating the fundamental changes in California’s economy that AB 32 measures are likely to cause. While critics of ARB claim that costs might be underestimated, this new study shows that many benefits also are not represented by models and more modeling isn’t as useful as consideration of lessons from prior policies and economics literature.

The study is timely because CARB will vote on the Proposed Scoping Plan to implement the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32) on December 11, less than a week away.

In the new study, Dr. McCann reveals that current techniques…

View original post 60 more words

Identifying the barriers to transportation fuel diversity

Tim O’Connor of EDF writes about the benefits of transportation diversification at EDF’s California Dream 2.0. I think that fuel diversity is a useful objective, but achieving that will be difficult due to the network externalities inherent in transportation technologies. Gasoline and diesel vehicles became dominant because having single-fuel refueling networks is more cost effective for both vendors and customers, and reduce the search costs for drivers to find those stations. Think of how many fueling stations someone might have to pass to reach their particular energy source. Investing in a particular fuel requires a certain level of revenue. Note how many local gas stations have closed because they didn’t have enough sales.

For a more recent example, we can look at cell phone operating systems. Initially each manufacturer had their own system, but now virtually all phones are driven by two systems, Android and iOS, while Windows 8 keeps trying to make inroads.

We need to be very aware of the fueling network economics when pushing for new transportation energy sources. Investing in a system is as much a set of business decisions as a policy decision. One approach might be to focus on using particular fuels in a narrow set of sectors and discourage broad sector-wide use. Another might be to use a geographic focus and to set up means of interconnecting across those geographies.

Yet another misconstrued view of “economics” in the climate change debate

Charles Mann wrote an interesting review of several books on climate change in The Atlantic Monthly. He portrays the debate as “Environmentalists” vs. “Economists.”  Unfortunately he describes economists as relying entirely on using central tendency expected values in standard cost-benefit analyses. And he fails to give economists full credit for creating the cap and trade system that he praises as an effective means of generating the change that is required.

The fact is that many economists are changing the debate on climate change to focus on deep uncertainty, to assess the costs of unlikely but catastrophic outcomes, to design effective technology subsidies, and to focus California’s climate change policies on global goals. All of these are important innovations that are affecting the debate over how to address the risks of potential climate change.

It’s important to recognize that we need to decide to act without full knowledge about whether climate change is driven by human activity or will it be of sufficient consequence to affect our civilization. If we live in a forest and there’s risk from a distant fire, we assess whether we need to buy insurance, clear brush around our house or evacuate. The fire may never come to pass–in fact the probability may be quite low, but we know the catastrophic consequences if it arrives. Is acting now to address climate change risk, both mitigation or adaptation, worth it? Economists have the tools to address this question–the problem is that key individuals in the media such as Charles Mann don’t seem to be aware of these, and so neither does the public or decision makers.

Distribution system operator rising

Two recent papers propose a new approach to managing the distribution grid by creating a “distribution system operator” (DSO). The DSO would control the local low-voltage grid between the substations and the customers’ meters, much as the independent system operators (e.g., CAISO, PJM, MISO, NEISO, NYISO) run the high-voltage transmission grid above the substations. The transmission and distribution system would be run as an open-access system, much as how many natural gas utilities are run now.

Lorenzo Kristov and Paul De Martini have written about this approach, focusing on the technical issues. They are agnostic on ownership, and talking with Kristov (frequently) he sees that the DSO can be either owned by the existing utility or spun off.

Former FERC Chair Jon Wellinghoff and James Tong of Clean Power Finance have addressed the ownership / management issue, proposing that the DSO be independent. They also have proposed that regulated utilities be allowed to own distributed generation on the customer side of the meter.

An important issue yet to be addressed in the creation of (I)DSOs though is transition and sustainability. The creation of ISOs has been politically traumatic, and creating IDSOs will face even more risk-averse political opposition, particularly in the West, after the energy debacle of 2000-01. We’ve also seen that ISOs are not particularly cost sensitive because they are largely insulated from direct cost regulation of the capital assets that they manage (a classic “agency” problem.) Since transmission is such a small portion of overall rates, the ISOs have been able to fly under the radar–but that may change soon.

Finally, it’s not clear how shareholders will view the change in asset ownership, management and returns. I wrote about this previously in the emergence of the “peer to peer” economy. Ensuring that shareholders don’t lose substantial value, even as the risk profile changes, will be key to easing the political process. There are alternative models for easing the asset management transition that is not threatening to current shareholders. There are better models than simply relying on regulated utilities to essentially do more of the same. Market forces are important in driving the innovation needed to transition the electricity system.  More on that another time.

Repost: Californians Can Handle the Truth About Gas Prices

Sev Borenstein writes about the two sides of the argument on whether transportation fuels should be rolled into the cap-and-trade program in January 2015.

I have an observation that that has only been alluded to indirectly in the debate. The main point of the legislators’ letter calling for a delay in implementation is that low income groups may be particularly hit. The counter argument that we need the inclusion of transportation fuels under the cap to incent innovation seems to pit the plight of the poor against the investment risk of wealthy entrepreneurs. We haven’t really done a good job of addressing affordability of the transformative policies that can change GHG emissions. The proposal to use carbon tax revenues to rebate to low income taxpayers has been floated at the national level, but of course that died with the rest of the national cap and trade proposal. A similar proposal was made to mitigate electricity price impacts.

Our state legislators are rightfully concerned about the impacts on those among us who have the least. Nevertheless, that problem is easily addresses with the tools and resources that are already available to the state. Those families and households who now qualify for the CARE and FERA electric and natural gas utilities rate discounts can be made eligible for an annual rebate equal to the average annual gasoline consumption multiplied by the amount of the GHG allowance cost embedded in the gasoline price. This rebate could be funded out of the state’s allowance revenue fund. For example, if the price is increased by 15 cents per gallon and the average automobile uses 650 gallons per year, an eligible household could receive $97.50 for each car.

About 30% of households are currently eligible for CARE or FERA. On a statewide basis, the program would cost about $650 million, which is comparable to the cost for CARE for a single utility like PG&E or Southern California Edison. Those legislators who are most concerned can coauthor legislation to put this program in place.

(BTW, I think the DOE fuel use calculator is outdated–on my many trips to LA I haven’t seen these types of fuel economy changes. My average MPG is pretty much the same no matter how much traffic there is on I-5.  But that’s just a fun fact aside…)

What is the true price for renewable energy power?

The renewable energy market has been in upheaval since the collapse of the financing sector in 2008. The withdrawal of easy money and uncertainty over federal tax policy has increased perceived risk.  Large firms have been shedding renewables subsidiaries and promising newcomers have dropped high-profile projects. Waste Management just sold Wheelabrator, exiting the waste-to-energy market. Brightsource suspended its Hidden HIlls solar thermal project. Much of this activity is driven by the perception that wholesale electricity market prices are falling and the underlying fundamentals will lead to further declines.

This perception is misplaced, however. Short run electricity market prices are falling as natural gas becomes cheaper, and more importantly, fossil fuel generation is squeezed out by increasing renewables and falling demand. However, the electricity marketplace hasn’t yet adjusted to the fact that natural gas generation is no longer the only marginal generation resource. In California, the renewables portfolio standard (RPS) makes at least 33% of the marginal generation from renewable resources. When capital costs are correctly figured in, and more long-term contracts are offered to match those deferred resources, power purchase agreement (PPA) prices for the right types of resources should increase, not decrease.

The problem is that the industry hasn’t been able to adjust its procurement model to reflect this new reality. I think this is coming from a combination of utilities continuing to maintain their monopsony (single buyer) position, risk averse regulatory agencies still relying on an obsolete procurement regulatory process, and those agencies enforcing the monopsony power of the utilities in the name of protecting ratepayers. This may not change until there is public acknowledgement that this situation exists. The difficulty is finding the right stakeholders with enough sway to raise the issue.

What we might expect for diffusion of new decentralized energy technologies?

Technologies and policies that enhance the development of decentralized energy resources have generated increasing interest over the last couple of years.  I’ll write more in the future about what are the underlying drivers, both technological and institutional.

I’ve been interested in the question of where do we stand, and how long might it take for diffusion of these new technologies. We can look back and see how technology transformed lives in just a couple of decades. Compare kitchens from 1900 and 1930; if we walked into the earlier kitchen, most of us would be lost, but we could whip up a meal in 1930.

 1030's Kitchen; Photo Credit - Henry Ford Museum

Or the rapid adoption of autos. In 1909, people could stand in the middle of Pike Street in Seattle and talk:

File:Seattle - Pike Street 1909.jpg

Not so safely in 1930:

Do we stand today at a point just at the onset of a new technological evolution?

One question to be answered is whether our institutional settings will allow these new technologies. In one case, it appears that Germany has already chosen its road. But in the US, whether we rely on central power stations using transmission lines may still be a question in play. That deserves a separate post of its own.

If we assume that we choose the decentralized path, what might we expect in when these technologies are adopted widely. A couple of graphics illustrate historic diffusion rates. This is one from VisualEconomics via The Atlantic:

Another one from Forbes via The Technium shows the parallel development paths (however, I don’t like starting at the year of invention instead of a threshold adoption level):

One might interpret the upper graph as showing accelerating adoption rates. But I interpret the lower chart as illustrating at least two factors that drive diffusion: the relative importance of network infrastructure and the expense relative to individual wealth.  Autos, telephones and electricity all required construction of a large network of roads or wires, often funded with public investment. Individuals can’t choose to adopt the technology until a larger public decision is made to facilitate that adoption.  As to expense, refrigerators and dishwashers were large household investments for many years, and cars are still a large single expenditure. On the other hand, cell phones, radios and televisions quickly became inexpensive which lubricated diffusion. We need another graphic showing how diffusion rates relate to these two different axes.

We are still unsure where decentralized energy technologies will fall among these characteristics. They may seem small and inexpensive, but enough solar panels to power a house will still be several thousand dollars for the foreseeable future. And the how much electric network investment is required to integrate these resources is the center of the debate over technology policies.

Too often studies making forecasts and policy recommendations don’t consider what adoption rates are feasible or probable. However a study comes along and incorporates this concept as its centerpiece. A good example is the Clean Energy Vision Project’s Western Grid 2050 report. Lead by a former colleague Carl Linvill, who’s now at the Regulatory Assistance Project, it looked at several different scenarios for technology diffusion. Such studies give us a better understanding of what’s actually possible rather than what we wish for.

Making Community Solar Gardens Work

California has been quite successful at encouraging the development of (1) large utility-scale renewables through the renewables portfolio standard (RPS) and other measures and (2) small-scale, single structure solar generation through the California Solar Initiative (CSI) and measures such as net energy metering (NEM).  However, there have been numerous market and regulatory barriers to developing and deploying the “in-between” community-scale and neighborhood-scale renewables that hold substantial promise.

Community-scale and neighborhood-scale distributed generation (DG) includes some technologies that simply are not cost-effective at the small scale of a single house or business, but are not large enough to justify the transaction costs of participating in the larger wholesale electricity market.  These resources, such as “community solar gardens”, can meet the demands of many customers who cannot take advantage of adding renewables at their location and can also reduce investment in expensive new transmission projects. Examples of these types of projects are parking structure-scale solar photovoltaics, solar-thermal generation and space cooling, and biogas and biomass projects, some of which could provide district heating.  Technology costs are falling so rapidly that these mid-scale projects are becoming competitive with utility-scale resources when transmission cost savings are factored in. SB 43 (Wolk 2013) recognizes that the promise of mid-scale renewables has not been realized.

In response to SB 43, each of the large investor-owned utilities–PG&E, SCE and SDG&E–have filed proposed tariffs with names such as Enhanced Community Renewables Program or Share the Sun. I filed testimony in the PG&E and SCE cases on behalf of the Sierra Club addressing shortcomings in those programs that would inhibit development of community solar gardens. SDG&E’s proposal, while not perfect, better meets the law’s objectives. After the hearings, the CPUC postponed a proposed decision from the July 1 deadline to October.

SB 43’s requirement that the investor-owned utilities “provide support for enhanced community renewables programs” is a critical step forward for California’s distributed energy goals.  The CSI is the state’s premier distributed generation program.  In SB 43 the Legislature expressed its intent that the “green tariff shared renewables program seeks to build on the success of the California Solar Initiative by expanding access to all eligible renewable energy resources to all ratepayers who are currently unable to access the benefits of onsite generation.”  SB 43 advances the success of the CSI into the area of multifamily residential and multitenant commercial properties and introduces all types of renewable energy resources.  Customers who, for various reasons, cannot benefit from the current net metering programs, will be able to benefit through SB 43.

The Legislature clearly intends for this program to lead to a transformation in the energy market akin to the success for single customers of the CSI. This necessary market transformation extends to multifamily and commercial lease properties that are currently beyond the CSI and Self Generation Incentive Programs (SGIP). The Commission should ensure that utilities’ programs under SB 43 provides the market transformation that is necessary for this underserved segment.

State regulations calls for all new residential dwellings to consume zero-net energy (ZNE) by 2020, and all new commercial properties by 2030.  Fully implementing the market transformation identified in SB 43 is one of the obvious means to achieve this target.  The CSI option has already facilitated many examples of feasible ZNE single-family homes using renewables well ahead of the 2020 deadline.  There are several market barriers to integrating renewables in a similar manner on multifamily and commercial leased properties and on single-family that are not favorably located or that have other impediments.

A properly-designed community solar garden program should provide a critical work-around for the split-incentive problem that has plagued local renewable development in California.  The split-incentive problem arises from the fact that multi-tenant structures, both commercial and residential, may not be able to implement solar or other renewable resources due to the fact that lessees are not the owners of the shared space where renewables could be sited.  The problem of split-incentives between landlords and tenants has long been recognized, and has been the focus of energy efficiency programs.

As a corollary, the Commission should provide individual developers and property owners the opportunity to integrate energy efficiency and DG measures to achieve the best mix for meeting environmental and economic goals. Each project is unique so that a “one size fits all” approach that requires sale of all output into the wholesale market with buyback from customers who may have no connection with the project will only discourage enhanced development.

For distributed generation to expand in California there must be a cost-effective path for residential and commercial tenants, as well as not-well-situated buildings, to install solar and other renewables and share the costs among other customers. The focus to date has been on either utility-scale or single-building scale projects, but the most promise may be in mid-scale projects that can serve a community or a neighborhood cost-effectively through a combination of scale economies and avoided transmission and distribution investment.  But to achieve this objective requires changes from current utility practices.

An update: Here’s the link to the decision on this CPUC case issued in January. And here’s the link to scoping memo for the phase of this proceeding.

Repost: What’s the Worst That Could Happen?

How do we best induce technological innovation? We’ve already run that experiment

Improvement in new and existing technologies’ performance and costs is a function of responses to a mix of market and regulatory signals. Finding empirical measures of differing innovation influences is difficult due to confounding influences. Yet we may be able to look at broader economic trends to discern the relative merit of different approaches.

The most salient example could be the assessment of comparative performances after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Allies conducted a 45-year experiment in which Germany was first split after World War II with largely equivalent cultures and per capita endowments, but one used a largely market-based economy and the other relied on central economic planning. When the two nations reunited in 1990, the eastern centrally-planned portion was significantly behind in both overall well-being and in technological innovations and adoption. West Germany had doubled the economic output of centrally-planned East Germany.

More importantly, West Germany had become one of the most technologically-advanced and environmentally-benign economies while East Germany was still reliant on dirty, obsolete technologies. For example, a coal-to-oil refinery in the former East Germany was still using World War II-era technology. West Germany’s better environmental situation probably arose from the fact that firms and the government were in an adversarial setting in which the firms focused on the most efficient use of resources and were insulated from political interest group pressures. On the other hand, resource allocation decisions in East Germany had to also consider interest group pressures that tended to protect old technologies and industries because these were state-owned enterprises.

The transformation of the West German economy, both technologically and institutionally, was akin to what we will need to meet current GHG reduction goals and beyond. This more clearly than any other example demonstrates how reliance on central planning, as attractive as it appears to achieving specific goals, can be overwhelmed by the complexity of our societies and economies. Despite explicit policies to pursue technological innovations, a market-based system progressed much more rapidly and further.